Implicit Egoism in Sentencing Decisions: First Letter Name Effects with Randomly Assigned Defendants by Chen, Daniel L. & Prescott, J.J.
IMPLICIT EGOISM IN SENTENCING DECISIONS:
FIRST LETTER NAME EFFECTS WITH RANDOMLY ASSIGNED DEFENDANTS
Daniel L. Chen∗
Abstract Implicit egoism is thought to cause individuals to create social distance from negatively-
valenced targets associated with the self. Implicit egoism is typically measured using name letter effects.
Using all 47,371 sentences in New Orleans District Attorney’s office from 1988-1999, I find that judges
assign 8% longer sentences to defendants whose first initials match their own. Name letter effects amplify
when the first and second letter of the name match, when the entire name matches, when the name letter is
rare, and appear for roughly all judges in the sample. The effects are larger for black defendants classified
(by police) as “N” rather than “B”. The first initial effect and difference by racial label replicate for the last
name. The results highlight the possibility that measuring behavioral bias can help document revealed
preference indifference and difference-in-indifference, and that group labels can reduce indifference.
Keywords: Decision analysis, judgement, legal processes, self-esteem, causal analysis
∗Daniel L. Chen, daniel.chen@iast.fr, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in
Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France. First draft: July 2016. Current draft: September
2019. Latest version at: http://nber.org/∼dlchen/papers/Implicit_Egoism_in_Sentencing_Decisions.pdf. I
thank research assistants for contributions to the project and numerous colleagues with helpful comments.
This project was conducted while Chen received financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Grant
No. 2018-11245), European Research Council (No. 614708), Swiss National Science Foundation (No. 100018-
152768), and Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
1
1 Introduction
According to psychologists, settings where people are closer to indifference among options
are more likely to lead to detectable effects outside of behavioral bias outside the lab (Si-
monsohn 2011b). This implies that documenting behavioral bias in judges helps identify,
what economists would call, “revealed preference” indifference. This article tests if judges are
swayed by the first initial of a defendant’s name using randomly assigned defendants and if
judges are more indifferent to certain groups of defendants.
Studying matching first initials is related to a set of experimental methods (i.e., unit re-
lation) that increase the psychological connection between a decision-maker and something
being evaluated (Heider 2013; Emmons 1984). Dating back to Allport (1937), it has been
suggested that an individual’s name is one of the most important components of self-identity,
and self-esteem has become one of the most researched topics in psychology (Sedikides et al.
2004; Swann Jr et al. 2007). The name letter effect and the endowment effect are said to have
the same origins (Kahneman et al. 1990; Beggan 1992; Baumeister and Bushman 2008)—sim-
ply being connected to the self is said to affect its value. Belenzon et al. (2017) found that
entrepreneurs chose to name firms after themselves and doing so is associated with higher
profits, higher return on assets, and fewer ownership changes.
Since Greenwald and Banaji (1995) suggested that the name letter effect could form the
basis of an indirect measure of self-esteem, the name letter effect has become one of the most
frequently used indirect measure of implicit self-esteem (Stieger et al. 2012, 2014), in part,
due to the fact that only the name letter effect and the Implicit Association Test approached
acceptable levels of test–retest reliability in psychometric properties of implicit self-esteem
measures (Bosson et al. 2000). A large literature examines first initial effects outside the lab
(Nuttin 1985, 1987; Pelham et al. 2002, 2003; Anseel and Duyck 2008; Coulter and Grewal
2014; Gallucci 2003; Hodson and Olson 2005; Jones et al. 2004; Chandler et al. 2008). These
studies have been criticized for lacking control (Simonsohn 2011a,b; Silberzahn et al. 2014),
though Jena et al. (2018) found that police speeding tickets differed for individuals who shared
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the police officer’s name.
People are extremely reluctant to revise their self-appraisals in a downward direction. Ego
threat occurs “when favorable views about oneself are questioned, contradicted, impugned,
mocked, challenged or otherwise put in jeopardy” (Baumeister et al. 1996), when one’s fa-
vorable view of self or public image has been attacked (Baumeister and Campbell 1999).
Following threat, individuals aggress against the source of the perceived threat (Bushman
and Baumeister 1998). There is evidence that individuals may socially distance themselves
from negatively-valenced targets associated with the self (Chandler et al. 2008; Finch and
Cialdini 1989). Aggression can be directed against an individual with the same identity as the
threatener (e.g., the individual and the threatener are on the same athletic team) (Gaertner
and Iuzzini 2005). Individuals seek to distinguish themselves from that person, or to punish
for the additional emotional cost that is experienced (Howard and Kerin 2011; Baumeister
et al. 1996; Bushman and Baumeister 1998; Boyd and Robinson 2015). Thus, following an
insult, they direct anger outward as a way of avoiding a downward revision of the self-concept
(Baumeister et al. 1996).
When it comes to sentencing, an initial-match triggers a unit relation, a connection to the
judge’s self, and the fact that it is connection to criminal activity that is negatively-valenced,
which can lead to additional punishment. My approach to studying name letter effects uses
each judge as their own control. Because judges may differ in their sentencing tendencies, I
look at instances in which judges sentence a defendant whose first initial matches their own
and sentences another whose first intial does not. I also account for the type of case, the
month, the year, the day, and week of the decision.
I find that judges assign 8% longer sentences when the first initial of their first name
matches the defendant’s. The effects amplify when the first and second letter match. The
second letter is usually a vowel, so this is roughly the first half of the first syllable (phoneme
or formant) of the name. The effects appear for roughly all judges in my sample, with roughly
10% displaying no effects and 10% displaying effects of the opposite sign. As replication, I also
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investigate the last name. Judges assign 7% longer sentences when the first initial of their last
name matches.
The second part of my analysis explores whether some groups differentially bear the brunt
of behavioral bias of judges. Conscious processing, directed by reflective thought can inhibit
the name letter effect (Koole et al. 2001) and thinking about reasons disrupt name letter
effects (Brendl et al. 2005). In contrast, in cases of legal indifference, irrelevant factors can be
expected to have greater influence. A judge could be said to have weak preferences, meaning
that there was a relatively low cost in departing from the legally optimal outcome.
Accordingly, I investigate whether African-American defendants categorized as “N” as op-
posed to “B” bear the brunt of name letter effects. “N” can refer to many different racial slurs.
A recent analysis of an embedded experiment in the American National Election Study found
that labels like “homosexual” as opposed to “gay” (a more inclusive label) affected survey re-
sponses on gay and lesbian rights (Smith et al. 2018). I find that first initial effects appear only
for defendants categorized as “N” and is absent for those categorized as “B”. This difference
in indifference is robust to a rich set of controls for skin color, eye color, and hair color. This
finding echoes a recent analysis finding that minority juveniles were particularly likely to bear
the brunt of the impact of football game losses on judicial decisions (Eren and Mocan 2016).
Lack of reflection or attention can be characterized as revealed preference indifference.
2 Methods
My data consists of 47,371 judicial rulings, collected from 1988-1999, by the New Orleans
Parish District Attorney’s Office. Its prosecuting attorneys are responsible for enforcing state
criminal laws to protect and serve the citizens of New Orleans and surrounding areas. In
January 1988, the Orleans Parish District Attorney established and instituted an office-wide
computerized system to collect data on every case processed through the office. The data
collection system was designed as an internal office management tool. The system collects data
about each criminal case that enters the prosecutor’s office at every step of the process, and for
the purposes of this study, the names of defendants and judges, and the police categorization
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of race, skin, hair, and eye color.
Once the cases went to the court, they were randomly assigned to a court section by
the clerk’s office. These court sections are labeled as A through Q in Appendix Fig. A.1.
The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court is composed of Sections A through L, as well
as Magistrate and Drug Sections. Each of the A through L Sections is composed of a single
judge, all of whom were located in the same courthouse on multiple levels. Louisiana Supreme
Court Rule 14 governs the allotment of District Court criminal cases in the state (La. Dist.
Ct. R. 14.0.). This allotment is random.1 The rules specific to the Orleans Parish stipulate:
The Clerk will assign daily, randomly, and by allotment among the Sections having felony jurisdic-
tion all felony indictments, bills of information charging felony offenses and appeals from Municipal
Court and Traffic Courts and other pleadings shall be allotted among Sections A through L and the
Magistrate Section. This allotment shall be conducted by the Clerk and shall be open to the public.
The District Attorney shall be notified of the allotment. A computer generated random allotment
system be and is hereby implemented by the Clerk’s Office for all cases filed with the Clerk of the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.2
The random assignment occurs through a “bingo” system. When the District Attorney’s office
accepts cases, they send the files to the clerk of court. The clerk then constructs an “allotment
sheet.” First, the cases are divided into classes based on the seriousness of the crimes charged
(Class 1 and Class 2 felonies, along with various classes of misdemeanors). The clerk then
matches the available judges to the incoming crimes within a given class. The number of
1Felony cases must be scheduled randomly to prevent the district attorney from choosing a specific trial
judge on the trial day and violating due process requirements. State v. Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1989 La.
LEXIS 2677 (La. 1989).
2The use of a computer may be unlikely for the early years of the data collection. La. Dist. Ct. R. 14.0,
Appendix 14.0A, available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/dist.ct/COURTRULESAPPENDIX14.0A.pdf.
The 1991 version of Orleans Parish’s Rule 14 was written as follows: “All cases pending in the criminal
district court shall be allotted equally among Sections A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J of the court. Except
on Sundays, legal holidays, and legal half-holidays, the allotment of cases shall be made publicly by classes
daily at noon by the clerk or a deputy clerk selected by him, in the presence of the district attorney. The fact
the accused was committed for trial at a preliminary examination shall not be grounds for the recusation of
the trial judge who held the preliminary examination.” 1991 La. R.S. 13:1343.
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TABLE I
Testing for Random Assignment of Cases
Dependent Variable: First Initial Match (First Name) First Initial Match (Last Name)
Pre-determined characteristics coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
Judge Male 0.0146 (0.0161) 0.00747 (0.0227)
Judge Republican 0.0435 (0.0310) 0.0276 (0.0314)
Judge Black 0.0224 (0.0434) -0.0253 (0.0412)
Judge Tulane Law School 0.0224 (0.0301) 0.0271 (0.0407)
Judge Southern University Law School 0.0234 (0.0277) -0.00355 (0.0146)
Judge LSU Law School -0.0779 (0.0606) -0.104 (0.0900)
Judge Loyola Law School 0.0635 (0.0568) 0.103 (0.0624)
Judge over 60 0.00515 (0.0642) 0.0632 (0.0655)
Defendant Male 0.00696 (0.0172) -0.00591 (0.00890)
Defendant has Scar, Mark, or Tatoo -0.00923 (0.00946) 0.0132 (0.0114)
Defendant has Brown Skin -0.00724 (0.00876) 0.0145* (0.00763)
Defendant has Black Hair -0.0155 (0.0125) -0.00349 (0.0118)
Defendant Height in Feet 0.0270 (0.0433) 0.0510* (0.0291)
Defendant Weight 1.254 (1.758) 2.257 (1.678)
Defendant Age 0.502 (0.541) 1.018 (0.446)
Time (Month by Year) 0.942 (1.307) -0.254 (1.265)
Time (Week of Month) -0.134 (0.371) 0.219 (0.375)
Time (Day of Week) 0.0337 (0.0248) 0.00522 (0.0381)
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
eligible judges for the week’s allotment determines how many marked balls go into the bingo
machine. Once a judge has been assigned a case from that class, he or she will not receive
another assignment until all the other judges in that week’s allotment have also received one
case from that class. Each class of crimes is allotted separately.
I find no change in pre-determined judge or defendant characteristics when the first letter
matches (see Tab. I)3. The first letter match rate is 6.4%, which is roughly 1/15 or what
one would expect with random shuffling of 15 letters (not all letters are evenly used, see
Appendices B and C).
3 Results
Results on First Initial of First Name I find that the sentence length is longer for
defendants whose first initial matches the judge’s first initial. This pattern is evident on the left
in Fig. 1, which graphs the density of log sentence length.4 When the first letter of a judge’s
3Appendix Tab. A.1 reports another assessment of random assignment.
4It is the exponential logarithm of 1+total sentence in days.
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and defendant’s name matches, judges reduce the likelihood of assigning sentences of zero
length and 1 year and increase their likelihood of assigning larger sentences. The distribution
appears roughly log-normal.
To account for the possible role of covariates in the patterns depicted in Fig. 1, I present a
multivariate regression with log sentence length as the dependent variable and a judge fixed
effect to control for the idiosyncratic tendencies for a judge, month by year fixed effect to
control for the tendencies to sentence that change over time, case class fixed effect to control
the fact that sentences likely differ by type of case, case class by month by year fixed effect
to control for differences in case type over time, alphabetic identity of the letter to control for
idiosyncratic differences in sentence length that differ by defendant’s first initial, week fixed
effects to control for idiosyncratic differences within month, and day of week fixed effects to
control for idiosyncratic differences within week (Tab. II).
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TABLE II
Name Letter Effect in Judicial Sentencing (First Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Letter Match 0.0851** 0.0801** 0.0929** 0.0858** 0.0812** 0.0821** 0.0820**
(0.0399) (0.0392) (0.0380) (0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0374)
N 47371 47363 47235 47190 47190 47190 47190
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.319 0.461 0.473 0.473 0.475 0.475
Judge FE X X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X X
Letter FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
The key predictor is an indicator for whether the first initials of the defendant and the
judge match, which occurs 6.4% of the time (see Appendix B for frequency distributions of
first initials of defendants and judges). When they match, sentence lengths are 8% longer,
equivalent to roughly 70 days or 2-3 months longer on average. The coefficient is positively
signed and statistically significant, confirming that the pattern in Fig. 1 is robust to controlling
for the attributes of the case and the judge. Adding the controls gradually renders a very stable
effect, further assuaging concerns of omitted variables.
The results are extremely similar in analyses where I drop outliers (see Tab. III). Results
are similar whether sentence lengths are winsorized (outliers replaced by the threshold value)
at the 1% or 5% level, or to sentences whose log length is less than 8. In addition, I rerun my
basic specification with the first letter of a randomly reassigned name (a natural bootstrap
with 200 draws). The true t-statistic lies to the right of all the other simulated t-statistics (see
Appendix Fig. D.1).
Results on First Initial of Last Name The results are similar in analyses of first inital
matches of the last name, which occurs 6.2% of the time. This pattern is evident on the
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TABLE III
Name Letter Effect Robustness to Outliers (First Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter Match 0.0929** 0.0940** 0.0888** 0.0826**
(0.0380) (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0404)
N 47246 47246 47246 44511
adj. R-sq 0.461 0.462 0.461 0.440
Sample All All All < 8
Winsorize None 1% 5% None
Judge FE X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
right of Fig. 1. When the first letter of a judge’s and defendant’s last name matches, judges
again reduce the likelihood of assigning sentences of zero length and 1 year and increase their
likelihood of assigning larger sentences.
Tab. IV reports that sentences are 7% longer for defendants whose first intial of their last
name matches the judge’s.5 The coefficient is positively signed and statistically significant, and
adding controls gradually renders a very stable effect, assuaging concerns of omitted variables.
The results are again extremely similar in analyses where I drop outliers, whether sentence
lengths are winsorized (outliers replaced by the threshold value) at the 1% or 5% level or
restricting to sentences whose log length is less than 8 (see Tab. V).
Results on Name Letter Effects by Judge I next present the name letter effect for
each of the judges in the sample, to see if self-identity manifests itself the same way in all
judges (see Appendix Fig. B.5 for caseload distribution across judges). Fig. 2 reports all but
three judges display significant name letter effects, and nearly all in the same sign. The judges
are sorted by caseload, suggesting that experience does not mitigate bias here. It is interesting
5Only 0.4% of observations have both the first and last name’s first initials matching between the judge
and defendant. 12% of observations have the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name
matching between the judge and defendant.
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TABLE IV
Name Letter Effect in Judicial Sentencing (Last Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Letter of Last Name Match 0.0706* 0.0801* 0.0676* 0.0659* 0.0637* 0.0609* 0.0614*
(0.0416) (0.0412) (0.0342) (0.0338) (0.0332) (0.0324) (0.0322)
N 47371 47363 47235 47190 47190 47190 47190
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.319 0.461 0.473 0.473 0.475 0.475
Judge FE X X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X X
Letter FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
TABLE V
Name Letter Effect Robustness to Outliers (Last Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter of Last Name Match 0.0676* 0.0615* 0.0620* 0.0777**
(0.0342) (0.0336) (0.0339) (0.0360)
N 47235 47235 47235 44505
adj. R-sq 0.461 0.461 0.460 0.440
Sample All All All < 8
Winsorize None 1% 5% None
Judge FE X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
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to note that the judge with the largest point estimate was found to have paid only $14 per
year in property taxes on his home instead of $2,200.6
Figure 2.— Judge-Specific Pooled Name Letter Effects
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Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level. Specification includes judge fixed effects, month
by year fixed effects, and case type fixed effects. Regressor of interest is the judge indicator interacted with
an indicator for whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
6https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/11/retired_orleans_parish_judge_a.html
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TABLE VI
Name Letter Effect in Judicial Sentencing (First and Second Letter)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First and Second Letter Match 0.225*** 0.223*** 0.168*** 0.158** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.0668) (0.0661) (0.0578) (0.0586) (0.0565) (0.0552) (0.0550)
N 47371 47363 47235 47190 47190 47190 47190
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.320 0.461 0.473 0.473 0.475 0.475
Judge FE X X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X X
Letter FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01). First and Second Letter Match means whether the first and second letters of the first name or the first
and second letters of the last name matches.
Results on First and Second Letter Match
The theories about first initial effects would seem to imply first and second letter matches
(the formant) should amplify name letter effects. Tab. VI shows the effects are larger when the
first and second letter of the first name match, which happens 1.7% of the time, or the first
and second letter of the last name match, which happens 1.6% of the time.7 The coefficient
stabilizes with the inclusion of the main controls. Fig. 3 show the corresponding shifts in
densities to assuage concerns of outliers.
73.3% of the cases have first and second letter matches of the first name or the last name.
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TABLE VII
Name Effect in Judicial Sentencing
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Name Match 0.191* 0.185 0.206** 0.194* 0.183* 0.180* 0.181*
(0.112) (0.112) (0.0940) (0.0970) (0.0958) (0.0940) (0.0939)
N 47371 47363 47235 47190 47190 47190 47190
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.319 0.461 0.473 0.473 0.475 0.475
Judge FE X X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X X
Letter FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01). Full Name Match means whether the first or last name matches.
Results on Full Name Match The theories about first initial effects would also seem
to imply a full name match should also amplify name letter effects. Tab. VII shows the effects
are larger when the first or last name matches, which happens 0.64% of the time. Appendix
Tab. D.1 shows that, even excluding sentences with a full name match, the effect of first initial
matches hold.
Results on Name Letter Frequency Letter frequency might amplify name letter ef-
fects, as uncommon letters might generate more salience when the first initial matches. Tab.
VIII shows the effects are larger for rare letters. Fig. 4 shows the corresponding effects for
each frequency bin of the first initial to assuage concerns of outliers.
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TABLE VIII
Name Letter Effect by Letter Frequency
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Letter Match 0.0759* 0.0712* 0.0828** 0.0776** 0.0775** 0.0776**
(0.0398) (0.0388) (0.0365) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0365)
First Letter Match x Rare Letter 0.269** 0.262** 0.297** 0.240** 0.249** 0.249**
(0.102) (0.105) (0.113) (0.0948) (0.0953) (0.0954)
N 47371 47363 47235 47190 47190 47190
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.319 0.461 0.473 0.474 0.474
Judge FE X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01). First Letter Match is a match on the first initial of the first name. Rare Letter is calculated from the
1990 U.S. census of names (at https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.male.first and
https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.female.first) and is a dummy indicator for
whether the cumulative frequency is less than 2.
Figure 4.— First Initial Name Letter Effects by Letter Frequency
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Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level. Specification includes judge fixed effects, month
by year fixed effects, and case type fixed effects. Regressor of interest is the frequency bin of the judge’s first
letter interacted with an indicator for whether the first letter of the first name matches. Frequency bins are
0-2, 2-4, 4-5, 5-7, 7-10, 10+. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.16
TABLE IX
Pooled Name Letter Effect by Racial Classification
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2)
First Letter Match x “N” 0.174** 0.168**
(0.0687) (0.0686)
N 41793 40011
adj. R-sq 0.475 0.442
First Letter Match x Judge FE X X
First Letter Match x Month x Year FE X X
First Letter Match x Case Type FE X X
First Letter Match x Skin Color FE X
First Letter Match x Hair Color FE X
First Letter Match x Eye Color FE X
Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as “N” or “B”. First Letter Match means whether the first
letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at the
judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
Results on Defendant Race Classification Next, I examine heterogeneity. In partic-
ular, I can examine whether the increase in sentence lengths is larger for defendants classified
as “N” (see Appendix E for frequency distribution of race classifications and over time). Tab.
IX reports a pooled regression of name letter effects for defendants classified as “N” vs. “B”.
The effects are larger for black defendants classified by police as “N”.
Tab. X reports the analyses separately by racial classification and finds that a large pro-
portion of the increase in sentence lengths in Tab. II comes from those classified as “N”. For
these defendants, the sentence length increases by 11% when the first initial of the defendant’s
name matches the judge’s (Column 1). The effect is robust to including fixed effects for skin
color, hair color, and eye color (Column 3) (see Appendix E for frequency distributions of skin,
hair, and eye color). For those classified as “B”, first letter matches insignificantly increase the
sentence length by 1% (Column 4).8
I replicate the analysis of heterogeneity for the first initial effect of the last name. Tab. XI
reports again a large proportion of the increase in sentence lengths comes from those classified
8On average, defendants classified as “N” have 22% longer sentence lengths than those classified as “B”.
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TABLE X
Name Letter Effect by Racial Classification (First Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter Match 0.107** 0.0349 0.106** 0.0122
(0.0459) (0.0951) (0.0455) (0.0967)
N 31931 9863 31730 8277
adj. R-sq 0.446 0.543 0.431 0.485
Defendant Sample N B N B
Judge FE X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Skin Color FE X X
Hair Color FE X X
Eye Color FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
as “N”. The point estimates are similar to that of Tab. IV for those classified as “N” (7%),
but not for “B” (0.8%). The difference in indifference is also robust to including the rich set
of controls for skin, hair, and eye color.
4 General Discussion
I find field evidence of implicit egoism—unconscious associations that individuals have with
others who share their first initials. When judges and defendants match on first initials, the
sentence imposed is 8% longer on average (two to three months) than when the judges’ and
defendants’ first initials do not match. This finding is not due to unobservables that change
across cases or over time and affect almost all judges. The effects are found for both first and
last names and amplify when the first and second letter match.
The effects appear more salient when a defendant is categorized as “N” than categorized as
“B”. This difference in indifference is consistent with some groups bearing the disproportionate
burden of behavioral bias in judicial decision-making and consistent with the real-world im-
portance of label changes by minorities attempting to redefine themselves and gain recognition
18
TABLE XI
Name Letter Effect by Racial Classification (Last Name)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter of Last Name Match 0.0650 -0.0137 0.0675 0.00796
(0.0442) (0.0733) (0.0454) (0.0882)
N 31931 9863 31730 8277
adj. R-sq 0.446 0.543 0.431 0.485
Defendant Sample N B N B
Judge FE X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Skin Color FE X X
Hair Color FE X X
Eye Color FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01).
and respect in a society that has held them to be subordinate and inferior.
Labels play an important role in defining groups—label changes can be seen as attempts
by minorities (based on, e.g., disability, race, gender, sexual orientation, or disease status) to
redefine themselves and to gain recognition and respect (Smith 1992; Martin 1991). The “N”-
word has been considered offensive because of its association with a long history of slavery,
segregation, and discrimination that treated African Americans as second-class citizens, or
worse. Since the 1960s, “Black” has been the preferred term.
If decision-makers are more susceptible to behavioral biases when they are more indifferent
to their decision, documenting behavioral bias may assist policymakers in detecting judicial
indifference. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg identified the New Orleans District Attorney’s office
“deliberately indifferent” to the rights of defendants in the Supreme Court case, Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). Ginsburg cited testimony from then District Attorney, Con-
nick, that he had stopped reading law books when he took office in 1974. If individuals expe-
rience indifference by important decision makers, everyday indifference can be an important
contributor to de-legitimization of legal authorities. If individuals experience difference-in-
19
indifference, it may contribute to disillusionment by certain societal groups.
20
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A Assessment of Random Assignment
24
This section presents another check for judicial random assignment by examining correlations between
judge leniency (calculated leaving out the current decision) and a collection of defendant traits. The judge
leniency (Zijt) is constructed as follows:
Zijt =
1
njt − 1
(
njt∑
k=1
Bk −Bi
)
− 1
nt − 1
(
nt∑
k=1
Bk −Bi
)
where i denotes an individual case/charge, j denotes the assigned judge, t is the year of observation, njt is the
number of cases seen by a judge in year t, nt is the number of cases seen by all judges in year t, and Bi is a
conviction decision.
APPENDIX TABLE A.1
Testing Random Assignment of Judges
Judicial Leniency
(1) (2)
Defendant Criminal History -0.00628 -0.00377
(0.00717) (0.00531)
Defendant Age 0.000168 0.000185
(0.000110) (0.000124)
Defendant has Black Hair 0.000691 -0.000516
(0.000618) (0.000852)
Defendant has Brown Skin 0.00218 0.00129
(0.00224) (0.00136)
Defendant has Scar, Mark, or Tatoo 0.00209 0.00205
(0.00118) (0.00118)
Defendant Height in Feet -0.00121 -0.000365
(0.000860) (0.000554)
Defendant Male -0.0000665 0.000461
(0.000704) (0.000630)
Defendant Weight 0.0000374 0.0000267*
(0.0000198) (0.0000132)
Defendant White 0.00139 0.00102
(0.00130) (0.00121)
Notes: Column (1) reports estimates from a single OLS regression of judge leniency on the variables listed
and includes case type by month by year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the judge level.
Column (2) reports separate OLS regressions of judge leniency on each of the variables listed and includes
case type by month by year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the judge level (* p < 0.10; ** p
< 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
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Appendix Figure A.1.— NODA Prosecution Flowchart
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B Distribution of First Initials of Defendants and Judges
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Appendix Figure B.1.— Distribution of First Initials of Defendants (First Name)
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Appendix Figure B.2.— Distribution of First Initials of Judges (First Name)
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Appendix Figure B.3.— Distribution of First Initials of Defendants (Last Name)
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Appendix Figure B.4.— Distribution of First Initials of Judges (Last Name)
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Appendix Figure B.5.— Distribution of Judges by Caseload
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000
frequency
SHIRLEY WIMBERLY
SALVADORE MULE
PATRICK QUINLAN
PARKER, Julian
OSER, ALVIN
MORRIS REED
MIRIAM WALTZER
MARK DOHERTY
Lawrence LAGARDE, jr.
LEON CANNIZZARO
JOSEPH GIARUSSO
JEROME WINSBERG
JAMES MCKAY
IKE SPEARS
HUNTER, SHARON
HUNTER, ARTHUR
GERARD HANSEN
GEORGE KIEFER
FRANK SHEA
FRANK MARULLO
ERNESTINE GRAY
ELLOIE, CHARLES
DENNIS WALDRON
CLARENCE GIARRUSSO
CANTRELL, HARRY
CALVIN JOHNSON
C HEARN TAYLOR
BURAS, CAMILLE
BOOKMAN (Drummer), MARY
BIGELOW, RAY
ARTHUR HARRIS
ANTHONY RUSSO
ANITA GANUCHEAU
ANDREW SCIAMBRA
ALARCON, TERRY
Notes: Original names as presented (commas corrected for in the analysis).
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C Distribution of First Initial Matches
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APPENDIX TABLE C.1
Distribution of Defendant and Judge First Initial Matches (First Name)
Judge
Dfdn A C D E F G H I J L M P R S T Total
A 9.02 13.37 7.89 2.65 12.01 3.12 0.36 1.19 14.59 7.6 3.55 9.98 6.7 5.27 2.69 100
B 9.08 15 8.7 2.46 10.78 3.36 0.43 0.85 15.32 6.46 4.16 9.24 6.19 5.5 2.46 100
C 9.25 13.44 7.85 2.31 10.86 3.25 0.54 0.7 14.46 7.9 4.49 9.84 6.88 5.3 2.93 100
D 8.48 13.71 7.81 1.54 12 3 0.33 1.29 14.93 6.88 4.67 9.01 7.7 5.65 2.98 100
E 9.63 13.97 6.45 1.39 12.36 2.82 0.27 0.72 14.82 7.7 3.63 10.88 6.99 5.28 3.09 100
F 9.89 14.44 6.68 1.34 12.97 3.88 0.53 0.4 14.44 6.82 5.08 8.56 7.75 4.81 2.41 100
G 8.31 14.09 7.1 1.39 11.72 3.87 0.12 0.4 14.72 7.22 5.43 11.09 6.76 4.79 3 100
H 9.01 15.25 7.13 1.39 11.29 3.07 0.1 0.69 16.93 5.54 3.76 8.71 8.81 6.14 2.18 100
I 7.42 17.21 12.76 2.08 9.2 2.08 0.89 0.3 17.8 5.93 2.97 7.72 8.01 4.15 1.48 100
J 9.64 13.95 7.08 2.58 12.18 3.34 0.34 1.16 14.61 6.86 3.7 8.96 7.26 5.56 2.76 100
K 9.67 15.68 8.23 2.22 9.81 3.97 0.14 0.6 15.86 6.65 3.73 9.25 6.05 5.38 2.78 100
L 9.17 13.97 7.95 2.46 10.58 2.73 0.16 0.79 15.28 9.1 3.75 8.54 7.26 5.26 2.99 100
M 9.14 13.62 7.51 2.38 10.92 3.26 0.47 0.75 15.15 8.11 3.66 9.08 7.79 4.85 3.32 100
N 8.46 14.58 5.47 2.08 16.67 3.78 0.65 2.34 13.67 7.16 3.78 8.07 6.12 4.95 2.21 100
O 8.95 15.34 10.22 1.92 10.86 2.88 0 0.96 15.65 6.71 3.19 8.31 6.71 3.83 4.47 100
P 8.02 14.06 10 0.99 14.95 2.57 0.2 0.59 12.57 7.92 3.37 9.31 6.53 4.06 4.85 100
Q 9.3 19.19 10.47 5.23 5.23 5.23 0 0.58 12.21 4.65 1.74 8.72 6.98 8.14 2.33 100
R 8.21 12.92 8.41 1.6 11.24 3.21 0.45 1.18 15.4 8.49 3.58 9.92 7.51 5.33 2.53 100
S 9.12 15.36 5.41 1.75 12.53 2.91 0.37 0.62 17.94 6.58 4.2 8.2 6.95 5.12 2.91 100
T 9.92 15.18 6.69 1.87 10.3 4.15 0.25 1.14 14.16 7.54 3.49 10.52 6.56 5.35 2.88 100
U 4.26 25.53 12.77 0 8.51 2.13 0 0 25.53 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 2.13 2.13 100
V 7.36 15.31 8.75 0.6 12.52 2.98 0.4 0.6 17.69 6.36 4.17 7.55 7.16 4.17 4.37 100
W 8.04 12.75 7.19 1.31 12.62 3.92 0.52 1.11 14.65 8.31 5.17 9.16 8.11 4.97 2.16 100
X 16.67 0 33.33 0 8.33 0 0 0 16.67 0 16.67 0 8.33 0 0 100
Y 7.56 13.45 10.08 1.68 15.97 1.68 0 0.84 20.17 8.4 4.2 9.24 2.52 2.52 1.68 100
Z 6.42 14.68 9.17 4.59 10.09 0.92 0.92 0 15.6 13.76 1.83 12.84 2.75 3.67 2.75 100
Total 9.02 14.13 7.6 2 11.56 3.29 0.35 0.93 15.1 7.45 3.98 9.38 7.09 5.25 2.86 100
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APPENDIX TABLE C.2
Distribution of Defendant and Judge First Initial Matches (Last Name)
Judge
Dfdn A B C D E G H J K L M O P Q R S W Total
A 2.44 9.64 5.86 0 3.23 6.53 9.03 6.71 1.95 1.95 16.6 0 3.9 10.07 5.25 6.22 10.62 100
B 3.26 8.03 5.72 0 3.35 5.59 9.63 8.4 1.81 2.27 17.3 0 3.26 8.13 6.2 5.74 11.31 100
C 2.89 8.47 5.81 0 3.6 6.99 9.85 7.88 1.5 1.77 17.43 0 3.13 9.65 4.93 5.1 11 100
D 2.28 7.18 5.77 0 3.65 5.81 9.65 6.95 2.2 2.71 19.47 0 3.65 9.46 5.22 4.24 11.77 100
E 2.82 8.47 4.44 0 3.9 8.2 10.89 5.78 2.69 2.15 16.26 0 4.03 9.41 5.24 5.38 10.35 100
F 3.4 9.33 4.41 0 2.97 7.31 10.42 7.24 1.45 1.81 15.63 0 2.6 10.56 5.57 5.93 11.36 100
G 3.4 10.85 4.92 0 3.09 5.42 10.24 8.16 1.37 1.88 14.09 0 2.94 9.93 6.34 6.08 11.3 100
H 3 10.27 6.43 0 3.06 6.1 9.64 7.24 1.53 2.58 17.39 0 3.09 8.92 5.11 5.53 10.09 100
I 3.09 8.25 3.09 0 3.09 5.15 9.28 9.28 1.03 0 18.56 0 9.28 6.19 7.22 4.12 12.37 100
J 2.35 7.95 5.21 0 4.6 6.23 10.22 6.93 1.55 2.66 16.59 0 3.88 10.91 4.43 4.74 11.75 100
K 3.19 6.12 6.12 0 2.39 6.38 8.11 7.45 0.93 2.39 17.02 0 3.59 8.24 6.78 5.98 15.29 100
L 3.11 8.2 4.83 0 4.71 6.43 8.91 7.9 1.51 2.61 15.68 0 3.83 9.84 6.09 5.84 10.51 100
M 2.86 8.88 6.17 0 3.36 7.43 9.03 6.85 1.88 2.21 16.44 0 2.76 9.26 5.85 4.72 12.3 100
N 1.62 8.98 6.04 0 2.95 7.51 5.74 8.1 1.91 2.95 14.87 0 3.09 12.52 5.89 6.92 10.9 100
O 2.26 4.52 3.23 0 8.71 7.1 5.81 11.61 0.97 2.9 16.77 0 4.19 8.06 5.48 5.48 12.9 100
P 3.37 8.03 5.4 0 2.49 6.41 9.27 8.03 1.98 2.44 16.84 0 3.32 10.98 5.81 5.4 10.24 100
Q 5.06 12.66 11.39 0 1.27 1.27 3.8 5.06 0 0 12.66 0 7.59 6.33 5.06 6.33 21.52 100
R 2.75 9.4 4.74 0 3.35 6.85 8.88 7.45 1.99 2.07 17.17 0.04 3.43 9.2 5.1 4.74 12.83 100
S 3.23 8.29 4.77 0.03 3.02 5.98 9 7.92 1.71 2.39 18.76 0 3.62 9.13 4.98 5.01 12.17 100
T 2.93 6.36 7.05 0 2.15 7.55 10.53 8.24 1.74 2.24 15.01 0 3.16 9.84 5.54 5.58 12.08 100
U 2.33 6.98 6.98 0 0 2.33 9.3 9.3 0 4.65 9.3 0 2.33 9.3 9.3 13.95 13.95 100
V 1.82 13.86 5.91 0 5 5.23 10 5 1.59 1.14 17.5 0 2.95 7.05 6.14 5.91 10.91 100
W 2.42 8.23 5.26 0 3.31 6.58 10.11 7.08 1.82 2.33 18.24 0 2.69 8.07 6.22 5.47 12.17 100
X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100
Y 1.92 10.77 4.62 0 2.69 6.54 10.38 8.46 1.54 1.15 16.92 0 1.15 9.23 5.38 5.77 13.46 100
Z 3.57 7.14 2.38 0 3.57 9.52 8.33 5.95 2.38 3.57 15.48 0 5.95 7.14 10.71 1.19 13.1 100
Total 2.86 8.53 5.51 0 3.4 6.46 9.52 7.53 1.73 2.28 17.01 0 3.3 9.38 5.55 5.33 11.58 100
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D Additional Baseline Results
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APPENDIX TABLE D.1
Name Letter Effect in Judicial Sentencing (Excluding Full Name Match)
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Letter Match 0.0816** 0.0847** 0.0825*** 0.0786** 0.0756** 0.0747** 0.0749**
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0290) (0.0294) (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0305)
N 47068 47060 46932 46887 46887 46887 46887
adj. R-sq 0.307 0.320 0.461 0.473 0.474 0.475 0.475
Judge FE X X X X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X X
Case Type x Month x Year FE X X X X
Letter FE X X X
Week of Year FE X X
Day of Week FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p <
0.01). First Letter Match means whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name
matches.
Appendix Figure D.1.— Randomization Inference with Randomly Reassigned Names
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E Distribution of Defendant Race, Skin, Eye, and Hair Classifications
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Appendix Figure E.1.— Distribution of Skin Color Classification
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Appendix Figure E.2.— Distribution of Hair Color Classification
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Appendix Figure E.3.— Distribution of Eye Color Classification
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Appendix Figure E.4.— Distribution of Race Classification
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Appendix Figure E.5.— Distribution of “N” Classification Over Time
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F Additional Racial Classification Results
I present analysis by judge’s race. White judges have slightly larger name letter effects for white defendants
(Appendix Tab. F.1 Column 3) than for non-white defendants (Appendix Tab. F.1 Column 4), but the effect
for non-white defendants is more precisely estimated.
Appendix Tab. F.2 examines difference in indifference to “N” vs. “B” and reports that labels affect both
black judges (Column 1) and white judges (Column 3), but the effect is larger for black judges. The sample
is restricted to defendants who are white or black.9 The effect is robust to the rich set of of controls for skin
color, hair color, and eye color, fully interacted with first letter match.
9All the judges are white or black.
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APPENDIX TABLE F.1
Pooled Name Letter Effect by Judge and Defendant Race
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter Match 0.113** 0.162 0.0726* 0.115
(0.0480) (0.212) (0.0360) (0.0806)
N 11953 1363 29837 3649
adj. R-sq 0.464 0.513 0.479 0.439
Judge Sample Black Black White White
Defendant Sample Not White White Not White White
Judge FE X X X X
Month x Year FE X X X X
Case Type FE X X X X
Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as “N”, “B”, or “W”. First Letter Match means whether the
first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at
the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
APPENDIX TABLE F.2
Pooled Name Letter Effect by Racial Classification and Judge Race
Log of Total Sentence in Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Letter Match x “N” 0.420** 0.410** 0.110 0.110
(0.171) (0.153) (0.0656) (0.0732)
N 11945 11480 29824 28511
adj. R-sq 0.471 0.438 0.483 0.452
Judge Sample Black Black White White
First Letter Match x Judge FE X X X X
First Letter Match x Month x Year FE X X X X
First Letter Match x Case Type FE X X X X
First Letter Match x Skin Color FE X X
First Letter Match x Hair Color FE X X
First Letter Match x Eye Color FE X X
Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as “N” or “B”. First Letter Match means whether the first
letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at the
judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
41
